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This article develops and tests a model of conditional status quo bias and American inequality. We find that
institutional features that bias policy outcomes toward the status quo have played a central role in the path of
inequality. Using time-series analysis of top income shares during the post-Depression period, we identify the
Senate as a key actor in the politics of income inequality. Our findings suggest that the supermajoritarian nature of
the Senate and policy stagnation, when coupled with economic and social factors that produce rising inequality,
create a situation in which inequality becomes difficult to reverse.
E
conomic inequality has been rising in the United
States.1 This is no longer news. After a lull in
sustained interest among scholars of American
politics, questions about the causes and consequences of
rising inequality have motivated a great deal of research
in the past decade. One of the core conclusions emerging
from this literature is that the politicians we elect and the
policies they pursue have dramatic consequences for the
relative well-being of the rich and the poor.
In this article, we move beyond explanations of
inequality that are rooted in partisan control of insti-
tutions and specific policy choices, exploring how
elements of the U.S. system that bias outcomes toward
the status quo have contributed to the rise of the
super-rich. We posit a theory of conditional status quo
bias which argues that the relationship between U.S.
policymaking institutions and top income shares is
conditional on both ideological divergence across
parties and past levels of inequality. Our results, based
on a time-series analysis of nearly 70 years of U.S.
income data, also suggest an explanation for why
inequality has continued to rise despite increasing
public concern regarding this outcome—enacting
the policy changes needed to reverse the upward trend
in the income gap has become increasingly difficult.2
The analysis discussed below enhances our
understanding of American income inequality in three
primary ways. First, we develop and test conditional
status quo bias (CSQB) as a theoretical explanation
for income concentration. A substantial comparative
literature focuses on institutional design as an important
correlate of economic inequality (Alesina and Glaeser
2004; Birchfield 2008; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993;
Stepan and Linz 2012). Recent research in American
politics also points to a role for status quo bias,
suggesting that as conditions change over time and
policy does not, outcomes are likely to shift producing
‘‘policy drift’’ and opening the door for massive
income growth at the top (Hacker and Pierson 2010;
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). We accept the
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2Of course, awareness and concern with rising inequality does not automatically translate into support for more redistributive policy
preferences (Bartels 2008; Kelly and Enns 2010).
289
This content downloaded from 128.084.125.208 on March 20, 2018 11:50:10 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
idea that several aspects of U.S. institutional design
correspond with economic inequality, but we contend
that these institutional factors become relevant only
when ideological disagreement across parties and in-
stitutions is sufficient to elevate the likelihood of
gridlock. In addition, we argue that these institutional
effects are more inequality-inducing when past levels of
inequality have been driven sufficiently high by other
political, economic, and social factors, meaning that the
trajectory of inequality is difficult to reverse in an
institutional context where policy change is difficult.
Second, testing the CSQB argument also allows us
to bring together two major traditions of work in the
area of U.S. income inequality. One research tradition
has emphasized the influence of legislative/executive
partisanship and the ideological content of policy-
making (Bartels 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Kelly
2009). For example, Kelly (2009) and Bartels (2008)
focus on partisan politics, arguing that Democratic
presidents have generated lower levels of economic
inequality during the post-WWII period than
Republicans. Hacker and Pierson (2010) focus on
the role of elite ideology, policy, and group-based
politics. In their account, rising inequality has been
driven by a rightward shift in American politics that
originates in the increasing influence of business and
the declining influence of unions in the political process.
In contrast to research on the ideological leanings of
government and policy, a second line of scholarship has
focused on explaining the dearth of policies that pro-
mote redistribution (even to the middle class) despite
rising inequality (Hacker and Pierson 2010; McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). We are among the first
to explicitly examine explanations from both of
these main traditions in a quantitative study.
Finally, we provide a quantitative test of policy
drift, an idea that has been derived and tested
almost entirely in the context of qualitative analysis
(Hacker et al. 2004; Hacker and Pierson 2010). Our
analysis of CSQB and economic inequality provides
the opportunity to specify some quantitative implica-
tions of the theory of policy drift. Specifically, we discuss
how the likelihood of policy drift in the context of
American political institutions has changed over time
and examine how shifts in policy drift are associated
with variation in income inequality over time.
American Institutions and
Economic Inequality
The heart of our theory is that the status quo bias in
American policymaking plays an important role in
distributional outcomes. Our basic argument is as
follows: a variety of economic, demographic, and
political factors have created the conditions necessary
for rising inequality. Without policy action, these
conditions translate into more income concentration.
But due to the status quo bias inherent in the U.S.
political system, such policy action is rendered
unlikely. Moreover, hurdles to policymaking exacer-
bate inequality to a greater extent as the gap between
the rich and the poor grows. That is, the inequality-
inducing effect of bias toward the status quo in U.S.
policymaking is enhanced as inequality rises and is
diminished as inequality declines.3
Observers of American politics are familiar with
many of the factors that make policy action difficult
in the U.S. system. Separated powers along with a
bicameral legislature generate multiple veto points.
Where veto points abound, policymaking is more
difficult because actors in a wider range of institu-
tions must come to agreement before policy change
can occur (Brady and Volden 1998; Krehbiel 1998).
Unlike a parliamentary system, where decisions taken
by the government are sufficient to enact change, in
the United States at least a majority in two separate
chambers of the legislature as well as the president
must come to agreement in order to produce dramatic
policy change through the lawmaking process. Having
control of even just the House of Representatives
presents a political party with the ability, under some
conditions, to dramatically influence the policymaking
process, particularly by shaping which status quo
policies are protected and which policies are part of
the policy change agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005b;
Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008; Krehbiel 1998; Richman
3We see two possible processes that could connect policy
stagnation to rising inequality. The first is a primarily economic
process, in which rising inequality increases opportunities for the
super-rich to use their economic power to enhance their well-
being. For example, the increased concentration of wealth implies
the super-rich have more capital to invest, more favorable
investment opportunities, and enhanced ability to outwait un-
favorable market conditions. Without regulatory interventions,
increasing opportunities for such monopoly-like gains increase
unabated, thereby generating higher levels of inequality. The
other process is more squarely in the political realm. Rising
inequality might place the rich at an advantage in the democratic
process, making it possible for them to consolidate power and
increase their relative status through politics (Bartels 2008; Gilens
2012; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Pierson 2000). If either or both
of these processes are at work, rising inequality becomes very
difficult to reverse as ever more drastic policy action would be
needed to undo the inegalitarian forces at work in the American
economy. It is possible, of course, that the effect of factors
connected to status quo bias is constant over time. If status quo
bias is simply one among many ‘‘constant causes,’’ we might
observe a relationship between status quo bias and inequality, but
this relationship would not vary with past levels of inequality.
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2011). Enhancing the difficulty of achieving policy
action is the fact that actors in the House, Senate, and
presidency are serving divergent constituencies—the
president with a national constituency, Senators elec-
ted by states, and members of the House from much
smaller districts within states. Finally, the comparative
lack of party discipline (relative to parliaments) and
numerous access points in the U.S. policymaking
system provide a high degree of influence for interest
groups, which tend to be particularly adept at stopping
legislation contrary to their goals (Gilens 2012; Hacker
and Pierson 2010).4
Within this system of separated powers, the
Senate has unique characteristics that further
heighten bias toward the status quo (Binder 2003;
Wawro and Schickler 2006). Most generally, the Senate
is designed to protect the rights of the minority and
even of individual members. In the modern Senate,
requiring 60 votes to pass legislation has essentially
become the norm. This, of course, is due to the often
discussed presence of the filibuster. It should also be
noted that there are numerous other rules and
norms in the Senate designed to protect the rights
of individual members, including holds on nomi-
nations, open procedures for amending legislation
on the floor, and the common need for unanimous
consent in order to move forward on Senate business.
All of this makes policy change difficult and in some
ways places Senate (in)action at the core of the U.S.
policy process.
How does this status quo bias relate to income
inequality? As economies change and societies evolve
in ways that enhance the possibility of gains for those
at the top, policy must adapt in order to counteract
increases in inequality (Hacker and Pierson 2010).
However, redistributional policy action is much more
difficult where institutions are strongly biased toward
the status quo (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Birchfield
2008; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Huber and
Stephens 2001; Stepan and Linz 2012; Tsebelis 2002).
A theory of status quo bias would predict higher
inequality in contexts where policy change is rendered
more difficult and government is therefore less respon-
sive to changing economic conditions generally and
rising inequality specifically. There is some cross-
national evidence in line with this expectation. While
most developed countries have faced economic
changes that have heightened inequality over the
past few decades, some have seen inequality increase
more than others. Previous research suggests that
where there are fewer (competitive) veto players and
policymaking is somewhat less difficult, increases in
inequality have been more limited than in countries
where there are more (competitive) veto players and
policy action is therefore more complicated (Crepaz
2001; Huber and Stephens 2006; Stepan and Linz
2012). Other studies have addressed the general
phenomenon of status quo bias and the conditions
under which specific policies become part of the
legislative agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 2010;
Cox and McCubbins 2005b; Finocchiaro and Rohde
2008; Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; McCubbins and
Schwartz 1984). However, this article offers the first
direct test of the extent to which status quo biasing
institutions help explain the widening gap between
rich and poor in the United States.
Moreover, the theory of conditional status quo
bias that we test here adds an important new insight
to our understanding of the relationship between
institutional structure and inequality. Our argument
is that the effect of status quo bias varies depending
on the existing level of inequality, with status quo bias
magnifying existing inequities more when societies are
already experiencing high inequality. If inequality is low
and economic conditions are not pushing inequality
higher, a bias toward the status quo in policymaking is
unlikely to produce rising inequality. While it may
be the case that stagnation in certain policy areas has
the potential to increase inequality over time regard-
less of the existing gap between the rich and the poor
(Hacker and Pierson 2010), major policy change is
likely unnecessary to keep inequality relatively low
when economic conditions are not inclined to widen
inequality. On the other hand, when economic con-
ditions are producing high levels of inequality, this is
precisely the time when dramatic policy action is
needed if rising inequality is to be prevented. In this
situation, status quo bias would enable substantial
increases in inequality. This leads us to predict that the
effect of status quo bias on rising inequality will become
greater as the existing level of inequality increases.
But how can enduring institutions explain varying
levels of inequality? Our answer is that the practical
relevance of status quo bias in institutional design
is shaped by politico-economic circumstances.
Consider veto points. Although the number of
checks on policymaking has not changed in the
post-WWII era, the relevance of these veto points
has varied over time. If the House, Senate, and
4Our theoretical focus is status quo bias and policy inaction. We
should note, however, that we also consider the role of policy
action since several recent studies have found that partisan
control of policymaking institutions and a variety of specific
policies help to explain the path of income inequality over time
(Bartels 2008; Kelly 2009; Kelly and Witko 2012; Tomaskovic-
Devey and Lin 2011; Volscho and Kelly 2012).
conditional status quo bias and top income shares 291
This content downloaded from 128.084.125.208 on March 20, 2018 11:50:10 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
President are all in agreement, the fact that there
are so many veto players is less relevant than when
these three players are at odds ideologically (Krehbiel
1998). If the veto players argument helps explain rising
inequality, then there should be a positive association
between preference divergence across the veto points
and income inequality. If, in addition, the theory of
conditional status quo bias is correct, the effect of
preference divergence on inequality should become
stronger and more positive as the gap between the rich
and the poor increases.
The eccentricities of the Senate can also be
translated appropriately into a crosstemporal context
in order to produce predictions regarding inequality.
First, if Stepan and Linz, (2012) are correct that the
Senate has more explicit power than the House, any
partisan or ideological effects (discussed below)
should be magnified in the Senate. Second, given
the important role of the filibuster in the Senate, if we
are correct that policy stagnation exacerbates inequality,
then as the ideological distance between the median
Senator and the filibuster-pivot increases, inequality
should increase as well. In addition, the conditional
component of our theory predicts that the inequality-
inducing effect of preference divergence within the
Senate should grow as inequality increases.
Data and Measurement
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable in
our analysis is the annual share of aggregate pretax,
pretransfer income held by the top 1% from 1940 to
2006.5 Our data are from the Piketty and Saez (2003)
top income-shares dataset (see http://elsa.berkeley.
edu/~saez/TabFig2008.xls) which is based on an
analysis of Internal Revenue Service tax documents.
This is widely regarded as the best source for
assessing incomes of very rich individuals, as is
our goal here.6
But why analyze pretax, pretransfer income? One
might suspect that limiting analysis to pretax/transfer
inequality excludes a role for politics and policy.
To the contrary, government has many ways to poten-
tially condition the market (Hacker and Pierson 2010;
Kelly 2009; Morgan and Kelly 2013). Nearly every
action that government takes can change the market
incentives of organizations and individuals. When
economic actors respond to government-induced
changes in incentives, the effects of these government
actions will most often be observed in the market.
Financial deregulation opened the door to ever more
inventive financial instruments, likely producing an
increase in market inequality (Tomaskovic-Devey and
Lin 2011). Tax policies affect wages, labor market, and
consumer behavior. For example, a reduction in taxes
on capital gains introduces an incentive to shift income
from wages to capital gains. Since the very rich receive
large portions of income from capital gains, such
a move is likely to generate higher levels of market
inequality (Slemrod 1996; Volscho and Kelly 2012).
Labor-market regulations affect wages, benefits, and
the power of unions. Monetary policy in the form of
interest rates affects the cost of borrowing. Some pre-
vious work has concluded that the super-rich benefit
from low interest rates because, as bond-holders, the
value of those bonds increases as the interest rate
decreases thereby enhancing the opportunity for cap-
ital gains income (Canterbery 2002; Henwood 1997;
Volscho and Kelly 2012). In short, almost everything
government does has the capacity to alter private
economic decisions at the margin, which can in turn
contribute directly or indirectly to income inequality.
In fact, one of the central arguments made by Hacker
and Pierson (2010) and Kelly (2009) is that gov-
ernment redistribution (which would be captured in
post-tax/transfer income) is not necessarily the
5We elected to focus on this time period for a combination of
theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, the 1940–2006
period allows us to analyze both a long period of income
compression and the more recent income divergence. Focusing
on this period also allows us to examine a period bracketed by the
two largest economic crises in U.S. history. We believe this is
important because it is likely that different economic and
political processes are at work during financial crises, especially
during the Great Depression. In particular, a Congress-centric
theory such as ours is unlikely to be operative during the period
when the FDR administration—because of the Great Depres-
sion—was taking unprecedented steps to control the legislative
process and shift power away from Congress (Katznelson 2013).
Practically, the start of our analysis is limited by the lack of
available data (including an essential control variable measuring
the importance of the financial sector to the U.S. economy).
However, to explore our expectations about the applicability of
our model in different periods, we reestimated models including
only status quo bias variables for various time periods. We found
that the results are consistent with those reported below for
periods starting after the Great Depression. However, consistent
with expectations, the effects of status quo bias are suppressed
when we analyze the Great Depression.
6The Piketty and Saez (2003) data do not require top-coding
the incomes of the super-rich, which is an important step
forward in measurement. All income data in this article refer
to Piketty and Saez’s series inclusive of realized capital gains.
We utilize an income concept inclusive of capital gains because
it is the most comprehensive income concept available and
captures an extremely important component of income for the
super-rich.
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primary mechanism through which the government
shapes distributional outcomes.7
Explanatory Variables
Institutionalized status quo bias. Given our
focus on the role of CSQB in contributing to
rising inequality, we consider three variables to
assess different facets of institutional design and
status quo bias. First, we include a measure of the
distance between the filibuster pivot and the
Senate median (Senate Median to Filibuster Pivot
Distance) based on Common Space DW-NOMINATE
scores (Carroll et al. 2011). These scores provide
a measure of the ideological preference of mem-
bers of Congress and presidents since 1940 in a
common ideological space based on roll call voting
behavior in Congress and public positions of the
president.
Using these scores for the Senate, we identify
the filibuster pivot, which is the ideological score
of the Senator whose vote is required to obtain
cloture. For each year, we identify the relevant
Senator by arranging the Senate from left to right
in ideological space based on DW-NOMINATE
scores. When Democrats are in the majority, the
filibuster pivot is the Senator who is more con-
servative than 59 other Senators. When Republi-
cans are in power, the filibuster pivot is the
Senator more liberal than 59 others.8 As the
distance between the median and filibuster pivot
widens, the relevance of the Senate’s unique in-
stitutional rules concerning cloture increases. This
measure is independent of partisanship, capturing
the propensity for policy stagnation due to ideo-
logical differences in the supermajoritarian Senate.
We expect the median-filibuster-pivot distance to
be associated with higher levels of income
concentration.9
Our second measure of institutional status quo bias,
also built using Common Space DW-NOMINATE
scores, is designed to capture changes in the relevance
of multiple veto points. We calculate the distance
between the House median and Senate median,
House median and president, Senate median and
president, and Senate median and filibuster pivot.
We then take the absolute value of the largest distance as
an indicator of maximum preference divergence across
the main policymaking actors (Maximum Preference
Distance). As preference divergence increases, the pres-
ence of multiple veto points becomes more problematic
for policymaking. If the presence of multiple veto points
has played a role in allowing rising inequality to go
unchecked, we should see a positive association between
interinstitutional distance and top income share.
Third, we include a measure that explicitly
captures the amount of policy produced by Congress.
This measure, which was originally developed by
Grant and Kelly, (2008), is based on a combination
of important and general lawmaking (Congressional
Policy Product). It measures overall legislative produc-
tion during each Congress and taps the idea of policy
stagnation. When less policy is being made, we expect
to observe increased inequality.10
To test our conditional hypothesis—i.e., the
effects of institutionalized status quo bias are more
inequality -inducing when existing levels of inequality
7Ideally, we could examine changes in both pretransfer
and posttransfer inequality in order to assess the dis-
tributional impact of the state via the market and explicit
redistribution. But since our goal here is to study the
level of inequality produced by the market, the Piketty
and Saez (2003) data are appropriate. Additionally, post-
transfer data that accounts for the incomes of the very
rich are not yet available over a long period of time.
Therefore, we restrict our analysis to pretax, pretransfer top
income shares.
8Prior to 1975, 67 votes were required for cloture, so our measure
is adjusted accordingly for these years.
9Our focus on preference divergence in the Senate places
ideological polarization at the center of the story regarding the
use of the filibuster in the Senate. It is also, clear, however, that
changing norms have contributed to the increasing use of
filibusters (Binder and Smith 1997; Koger 2010; Wawro and
Schickler 2006). In a supplemental information (SI) file, we
report additional models that attempt to capture the role of
norms as opposed to preference divergence in the Senate. In these
supplemental models, we include the number of cloture motions
filed. While the actual use of the filibuster is surprisingly difficult
to capture empirically, cloture motions are often cited as a key
indicator. We find that the results reported below remain
essentially unchanged with controls for cloture motions and that
cloture motions have a much weaker effect on inequality than the
filibuster-pivot distance variable described above.
10In the Supporting Information, we also present an analysis in
which Congressional Policy Product is modeled as a variable
intervening between the indicators of status quo bias and
inequality. This accounts for the fact that the models below
capture only the direct effects of status quo bias on inequality and
ignores any potential indirect effects that occur via reductions in
legislative output. The implications for our analysis below remain
unchanged. However, not surprisingly, we find that higher levels
of house polarization are significantly related to lower levels of
Congressional Policy Product. This result implies that house
polarization also indirectly influences top income shares via the
resulting reduction in policy activity.
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are high—the three measures are interacted with prior
levels of inequality. These interaction terms allow
a direct test of the hypothesis that rising inequality
(whether caused by economic factors, political factors,
or both) will be more likely to persist as status quo bias
increases.
Party polarization. We include the ideological
distance between the median member of the majority
and minority parties in the House to account for
general partisan polarization (House Party Polarization).
Though clearly connected to the idea of policy stagna-
tion, general polarization is not a feature of institutional
design as much as it is an indicator of current political
conditions. Thus, we are most interested in this variable
in order to ensure that any effects connected to the
unique features of U.S. institutional structures are not
simply generated by overall patterns of partisan
polarization (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).11
This measure is based on the previously discussed
Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores. We also
interact this variable with prior levels of inequality in
order to control for any conditional effects of general
polarization.
Partisan and Policy Controls
Partisan politics, in the form of party control of the
presidency and/or Congress, plays prominently in
several analyses of income inequality (Bartels 2008;
Campbell 2011; Hibbs and Dennis 1988; Kelly 2009;
Kenworthy 2010). Democrats, as the party more
strongly supported by middle- and working-class
voters, have a strong electoral incentive to support
programs to reduce inequality. Republicans, who
receive more of their support from the upper end
of the income distribution, are often eager to enact
upwardly redistributive policy interventions. It is
essential to control for partisan and ideological expla-
nations of inequality in order to accurately assess the
effects of variables connected to status quo bias.
We thus incorporate two measures reflecting party
control in Congress: party control of the Senate, and
party control of the House, which are coded 1 when
Democrats maintain a majority and 0 when Repub-
licans are in control.12
We also consider the effects of monetary, tax, and
regulatory policies on distributional outcomes.
Despite the fact that our focus is status quo bias
and policy inaction, it is clear from other recent studies
of American income inequality that much of the policy
action, at least since the 1970s, has contributed to rising
inequality. Higher interest rates have been shown to
reduce top income shares (Volscho and Kelly 2012),
and we include this measure of monetary policy in our
analysis. Despite the fact that our dependent variable is
measured on a pretax basis, tax policy might also
influence top income shares by influencing labor-
market effort or by incentivizing income shifting across
time or income sources. We consider two tax-policy
measures. First, we include the top marginal income-
tax rate since this is the rate most likely to affect the
earned income of the top 1%.13 Second, we include
the top capital-gains rate. Since those in the top 1%
receive large amounts of income in the form of capital
gains, changes to this area of tax policy are likely to
influence top income shares.14 Finally, we include a
measure of financial deregulation Philippon and
Reshef (2012) with the expectation that deregulation
will enhance top income shares.
Socioeconomic Control Variables
We also include variables controlling for three partic-
ularly important aspects of the general social-economic
context that are likely relevant for understanding the
rise of top income shares—union strength, financializa-
tion, and economic growth.
Decline of Unions. Union strength is a central
aspect of several theories of income inequality.
Strong unions give greater bargaining power to labor
versus capital and redistribute wages downward
11In other words, general party polarization itself would not be
expected to have particularly unique effects in the American
context. Factors related to interinstitutional disagreement and the
supermajoritarian nature of the Senate, described above, are the
relevant variables for testing our theory of CSQB and inequality
in the United States. Of course the three measures of status quo
bias we discuss are empirically related to ideological polarization.
In the Supporting Information, we discuss the distinctiveness of
status quo bias measures from general polarization and estimate
additional models that address potential questions about collin-
earity between the measures of status quo bias and general
polarization. Consistent with the results reported below, the
supplemental analysis suggests that measures of status quo bias,
though they are related to general polarization, are more effective
explanations of income inequality over time than general
polarization. We believe this is largely due to the fact that
focusing on status quo bias accounts for how ideological divides
play out in the institutional structure of U.S. government,
particularly the important role of the Senate.
12We also considered variables connected to the ideology rather
than the partisanship of Congress, and the results vary only
slightly (see Table 4 in the Supporting Information).
13These data come from the Policy Center of the Urban Institute
and Brookings Institution and are available online at http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid5213, accessed
3/26/2011.
14These data come from Citizens for Tax Justice. Available at
http://www.ctj.org/pdf/regcg.pdf (accessed February 12, 2012).
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(Bradley et al. 2003; Hicks 1999; Huber and Stephens
2001; Korpi 1978; Moller et al. 2003; Stephens
1979). We include a measure of union density to
control for the strength of unions in the U.S.
economy (Hirsch 2008).
Financialization. Financial transactions have
increased dramatically in their complexity and
profitability. Financialization—the growing importance
of financial markets and institutions for economic
outcomes—has expanded notably in the U.S. economy
(Krippner 2011). This process, which is likely due in
part to regulatory policy changes, could generate rising
inequality due to the shift of income and profits toward
this relatively wealthy economic sector (Demenil and
Levy 2004; Kaplan and Rauh 2010; Tomaskovic-Devey
and Lin 2011). We capture the concept of financializa-
tion by measuring financial sector profits as percentage
of GDP. The data are provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (2012).
Economic growth. Finally, we include GDP per
capita in constant 2005 dollars in our analysis to control
for general economic conditions and to account for
opportunities for significant income gains among the
rich.
Methods
We model top income shares using single equation
error correction models (ECMs). Many of the varia-
bles in our analysis are nonstationary, and ECMs can
avoid the risk of spurious regression results when
estimating relationships between nonstationary varia-
bles (Banerjee et al. 1993; Engle and Granger 1987).
We report tests of stationarity and integration in the
Supporting Information file, which shows that most
of our variables are clearly integrated. We also report
tests to confirm that cointegration is present between
our integrated dependent variable and the integrated
explanatory variables, a step which is necessary to
ensure that the ECM is an appropriate solution to the
spurious regression problem.15 Based on these assess-
ments, an ECM is an appropriate way to estimate
relationships between the variables included in our
analysis.
ECMs also allow an assessment of both immediate
effects and effects that are distributed over time. In our
analysis, for example, it is possible that a shift in tax
policy produces an immediate effect on top income
shares. But it is also possible that the effect of a tax-
policy change is not fully realized immediately. It is
likely, in fact, that income responds to changes in
tax policy over a period of years through a partial-
adjustment process. In a partial-adjustment process,
a change in tax policy would shift the equilibrium
top income share, and top shares would gradually
move toward that new equilibrium value over time.
In fact, for most of the variables in our analysis, we
expect most if not all of the impact to be distributed
over time. Generally speaking, the political, social,
and economic factors that most likely explain the
path of top income shares over time are thus likely
to exhibit a long-run relationship. Nevertheless, the
methodology we use allows us to capture both
short- and long-run effects.16
Moving on to the nuts and bolts of an ECMmodel
and how to interpret it, we begin with the bivariate
equation version of the ECM:
DYt ¼ a0 þ a1Yt1 þ b1DXt þ b2Xt1 þ et :
For each independent variable X, we have up to two
parameter estimates—b1 for the differenced variable,
or its change from one point in time to the next, and
b2 for the lagged level of the variable, which can be
dropped from the equation if we find that it has no
statistically significant impact. b1 provides an estimate
of the initial change in the dependent variable pro-
duced in the short term by a shock to the independent
variable. We call this the immediate effect. b2 and
a1 provide the information needed to estimate the
‘‘long-term’’ effect. This is also called the error-
correction component of the model. The long-term
impact is the portion of the connection between X
and Y that does not occur at one particular point in
time but is distributed temporally such that a portion
of the impact is felt in each period over a time span.
The size of this long-run impact is a function not
only of b2 but also of a1, which is known as the
15Specifically, we establish cointegration with an augmented
Engle-Granger test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993, 720–21),
which requires regressing top income shares on the predictors,
performing an Augmented Dickey Fuller test on the residuals,
and finally comparing the resulting test statistic to the corre-
sponding critical value. Additionally, weak exogeneity is estab-
lished following Charemza and Deadman (1992, 231–32); that is,
the error-correction mechanism is insignificant when included in
models of each of the predictor variables.
16All of our models were initially estimated with Ordinary Least
Squares. However, if a Breusch-Godfrey test indicated residual
autocorrelation, we reestimated the model using Prais-Winsten
regression, which is an appropriate strategy to correct autocor-
relation in time-series models including the lagged level of the
outcome variable (Keele and Kelly 2006). The results of our core
models are similar without a correction for autocorrelation (see
Table 4 in the Supporting Information) indicating that our
results are not sensitive to this estimation choice.
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error-correction rate. The total long-term impact of a
shock toX on Y via the error-correction component, the
long-run multiplier, is computed by dividing b2 by a1.
Aside from being a component in the computation
of an explanatory variable’s impact, the error correction
rate also tells us how quickly a disturbance from long-
run equilibrium is eliminated. Estimates of a1 will
be between 0.0 and 21.0, and the closer this parameter
is to 21.0, the more quickly errors are corrected. The
substantive interpretation of the coefficient is the pro-
portion of the disequilibrium corrected in each time
period, beginning at t 1 1. From this error-correction
rate, we can determine how quickly the total long-run
impact is felt.
Analysis
We begin our analysis in Figure 1 with a very simple
plot of top income shares along with two of our key
indicators of status quo bias—filibuster-pivot distance
and Congressional Policy Product. For the purposes of
the figure, we standardize all three measures so that
they appear on a similar scale. We also invert the scale
of Congressional Policy Product so that more positive
values indicate less policy output. This aids the visual
presentation so that we can expect a positive associ-
ation with the three variables over time. And that is
exactly what we observe. Particularly as inequality
has risen since the 1970s, we observe an increase in
filibuster-pivot distance and an increase in policy
stagnation. In the late 1950s into the 1960s, there is
some divergence between filibuster-pivot distance
and top income shares, but this is exactly what our
theory of CSQB would predict. Since inequality was
low during this period, status quo bias is less likely
to contribute to rising inequality. But this simple
visual inspection is just a first step. In the more
rigorous analysis reported below, we begin with
simplified models focusing only on factors related
to the theory of CSQB. We then move on to more
fully specified models that consider other explan-
ations. The heart of our analysis is presented in
Table 1.
Model 1 includes three variables capturing in-
stitutional aspects of the U.S. system related to
status quo bias—Senate Median to Filibuster-Pivot
Distance, Maximum Preference Distance, and
Congressional Policy Product. We also include
House Party Polarization since we want to guard
against any filibuster-pivot effect being driven by
general patterns of party polarization. These variables
only capture the direct effect of status quo bias variables
on inequality. A second aspect of the theory is that the
effect of institutional bias toward the status quo will
become more important as inequality rises. That is, as
income concentration increases, the effect of institu-
tional factors related to status quo bias will become
even more inequality inducing. We expect to observe
this pattern because greater levels of inequality require
greater policy action to reverse. If institutional factors
activate status quo bias in this context, policymaking
stagnates, allowing inequality to increase unchecked,
heightening the inegalitarian bias in the system. We test
these ideas with multiplicative interaction terms
between the lagged level of income inequality and
the lagged level of the three institutionalized status
quo bias variables as well as party polarization.
We construct the interaction terms using the lagged
levels of the status quo bias variables because the
FIGURE 1 Top Income Shares and Status Quo Bias, 1940–2006
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TABLE 1 Models of Top Income Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Top 1% Share, Including Capital Gainst21 -0.18***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.06)
-0.43***
(0.09)
-0.17*
(0.09)
-0.19***
(0.05)
D Senate Median to Filibuster Pivot Distancet 6.77*
(3.66)
5.45
(3.93)
7.17*
(3.92)
7.03*
(4.07)
8.57**
(3.58)
Senate Median to Filibuster Pivot Distancet21 8.16***
(2.80)
6.14*
(3.28)
6.18
(4.80)
9.12***
(3.32)
7.71***
(2.74)
D Maximum Preference Distancet -0.17
(0.88)
-0.52
(0.92)
0.80
(0.91)
-0.10
(1.35)
Maximum Preference Distancet21 0.09
(0.70)
-0.28
(0.81)
-0.81
(0.91)
-0.13
(1.06)
D Congressional Policy Productt 0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
Congressional Policy Productt21 -0.04***
(0.01)
-0.02*
(0.01)
-0.05**
(0.02)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.01)
D House Party Polarizationt 9.22
(6.02)
7.32
(6.81)
2.20
(6.02)
6.95
(7.64)
House Party Polarizationt21 4.02
(2.55)
4.02
(2.74)
1.62
(3.99)
0.02
(5.96)
4.43**
(1.75)
Filibuster Distance*Top Sharet21 1.75**
(0.75)
1.08
(0.90)
2.59**
(1.04)
1.95*
(0.98)
1.48*
(0.74)
Maximum Distance*Top Sharet21 0.34
(0.26)
0.34
(0.27)
0.13
(0.29)
0.24
(0.33)
Congressional Policy Product*Top Sharet21 -0.01**
(0.00)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.01*
(0.00)
House Party Polarization*Top Sharet21 -3.00***
(0.90)
-2.18**
(1.07)
-3.57***
(1.31)
-3.32**
(1.29)
-2.30***
(0.76)
D Democratic Senatet -0.75
(0.59)
Democratic Senatet21 -0.68
(0.44)
D Democratic Houset 0.48
(0.69)
Democratic Houset21 0.11
(0.50)
D Top Capital Gains Tax Ratet -0.04
(0.05)
Top Capital Gains Tax Ratet21 -0.04
(0.04)
D Top Marginal Tax Ratet -0.02
(0.03)
Top Marginal Tax Ratet21 -0.06**
(0.02)
D Financial Deregulationt 1.50**
(0.65)
Financial Deregulationt21 0.01
(0.48)
D Prime Ratet -0.48**
(0.18)
Prime Ratet21 -0.25**
(0.11)
D Financial Profits, % GDPt 0.12
(0.88)
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primary effect of these variables is via the error-
correction component of the model, which is captured
in the coefficient for the lagged level of each variable. By
interacting the status quo bias measures with the lagged
level of top income shares, we directly test the idea that
rising inequality has made status quo bias more
important as an explanation of distributional outcomes.
In this initial model, we see support for aspects of
the CSQB argument. The effect of the Senate Median
to Filibuster-Pivot Distance is positive and signifi-
cant, suggesting that as ideological distance between
the median and filibuster-pivot Senators increases,
inequality increases as well. Also, the long-run effect
of Congressional Policy Product is negative, meaning
that less policymaking is associated with more in-
equality. These are important results. Status quo bias
corresponds with the proportion of income held by
the richest 1% of Americans. Furthermore, the inter-
actions between these variables and past values of top
income share are significant in the expected direction.
Since the status quo bias variables are each part of
multiplicative interaction terms, the effects estimated
are conditional on the value of inequality. The esti-
mated main effect for each variable is its effect when
inequality is at its mean value (since we mean-centered
all variables prior to calculating interaction terms).
To get a more complete sense of how the effect of the
status quo bias variables change at differing levels of
inequality, Figure 2 presents the marginal effects of the
four variables included in this model at all observed
values of top income share. The conditional effects of
Filibuster-Pivot Distance and Congressional Policy
Product are both consistent with the idea that status
quo bias becomes more inequality-inducing as inequal-
ity rises. At high levels of inequality, the Filibuster-Pivot
Distance has a strong and significant positive effect
on inequality. Likewise at high levels of inequality,
Congressional Policy Product has a negative relation-
ship with inequality. While the interaction term for
maximum ideological distance across policymaking
branches is in the expected direction, it is not sig-
nificant, and the effect of preference distance never
reaches statistical significance at any level of inequality.
These results are generally supportive of the argument
that policy action is necessary to reduce inequality,
that the institutional design of the U.S. policymaking
system makes it difficult to produce such policy action,
and that this status quo bias becomes increasingly
important as inequality rises.17 These results also point
TABLE 1 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial Profits, % GDPt21 0.16
(0.56)
D Union Membership Ratet 0.03
(0.19)
Union Membership Ratet21 0.01
(0.10)
D Real GDP Per Capita (2005 USD)t -0.00
(0.00)
Real GDP Per Capita (2005 USD)t21 0.00
(0.00)
Constant 0.27*
(0.14)
0.60
(0.41)
6.45***
(2.13)
-1.03
(3.37)
0.30**
(0.14)
Observations 67 67 67 67 67
R2 0.55 0.57 0.69 0.56 0.48
Note: Prais-Winsten estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*p , 0.10; **p , 0.05; ***p , 0.01; two-tailed tests.
17While our primary purpose for including House Party Polar-
ization is to ensure that the effect of Senate Filibuster-Pivot
Distance is not driven by general polarization, we should note
that the interactive effect of party polarization is at first blush not
fully anticipated. The observed positive relationship in Figure 2
between polarization and top income share when inequality is
low aligns with our expectations and the earlier bivariate results
of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006). But as inequality rises,
after controlling for institutional status quo bias, the effect of
party polarization becomes somewhat more egalitarian. We think
this result may be explained by the fact that polarization in the
House is not as disruptive to the policymaking process as the
Filibuster-Pivot Distance in the Senate. This makes sense given
the procedural capacity of the House majority to move legislation
through the chamber quite efficiently (Cox and McCubbins
2005a), perhaps having even more ability to do so when party
polarization is high (Aldrich and Rohde 2000). Furthermore, as
we report in the Supporting Information, the indirect effect of
house polarization (through Congressional Policy Product)
implies that when inequality is high, the total effect of polarization
is as expected.
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to the central role of the Senate in the U.S. governing
system. It is status quo bias in the Senate that has the
most consistent (conditional) effect on top income
shares.
In Model 2, we control for partisan control of
Congress.18 With controls for these partisan explan-
ations of top income shares, the core results are
similar, though some variables now fail to achieve
statistical significance. However, the partisan variables
have no effect on top shares when variables related to
status quo bias are considered. Indeed, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the combined influence
of all partisan variables is different from zero
(p 5 0.52). Model 3 replaces partisan variables
with policy variables. Again, the results for the status
quo bias variables are quite similar to the initial model.
We also see here that some of the policy variables have
the expected relationships. The results suggest that
increasing the top marginal tax rate decreases top
income shares, with this effect occurring over the long
term. Financial deregulation corresponds with greater
income inequality, but this relationship occurs over
the short term, having its full effect within a year.
Increasing interest rates appears to affect top income
shares in both the short and the long term, immedi-
ately decreasing top income shares and also having an
egalitarian effect that is spread out over a longer
period of time. In this model, long-term effects are
felt at a rate of 43% each year, so it take several years to
be fully observed. In Model 4, we include controls for
social and economic conditions. With controls for
general economic conditions, the shifting structure of
FIGURE 2 Effect of Status Quo Bias at Observed Levels of Lagged Top Share
18Controlling for the party of the president does not substantially
alter the substantive results reported here (see Table 4 in the
Supporting Information file) but consistent with other work
(Volscho and Kelly 2012) is not a predictor of top income shares
so is excluded from these models.
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the economy toward finance, and the decline of
unions, the results for our CSQB measures remain as
reported in the initial model. Finally, in Model 5 we
report an extremely parsimonious model that only
includes variables related to status quo bias and polar-
ization that were significant in earlier models. We do
this to ensure that our core results are not somehow
driven by overfitting, which is a potential concern here
given the large number of coefficients estimated in the
first four models. Again, the core results reported
above hold.
To this point we have said little about the sub-
stantive effects of the variables in our model. As a first
step in this direction, we should point out that the
models we estimate explain a substantial amount of
variance in over-time change in the share of income
held by the top 1%. The R2 of the models are between
0.48 and 0.69. More to the point, the statistically
significant effects estimated above are quite large.
In Figure 3, we chart the total expected shift (and 95
percent confidence interval) in top income shares
(long-run or short-term as appropriate) produced by
a standard deviation shift in the key explanatory
variables from Model 3. Because the estimates for
Filibuster-Pivot Distance and Congressional Policy
Product are conditional on the past value of top
income share, we report two estimates for these
variables. The solid dot represents the total expected
effect at the mean value of top income share. The
hollow dot corresponds with the total expected effect
when the proportion of income held by the top 1%
is one standard deviation above the mean value.
The figure indicates that when income is concen-
trated among the top 1% at a level one standard
deviation above the average from the last 70 years,
then Filibuster-Pivot Distance, Congressional Policy
Product, and top marginal tax rates have expected
effects of a similar magnitude. Financial deregulation
and monetary policy have smaller but still important
effects. Even a one percentage point shift in top
income shares is extremely important because such
a shift represents billions of dollars in the contem-
porary U.S. economy.
The results generally support our theory of CSQB.
But it is interesting to note that not all indicators of
status quo bias have the expected effect. None of the
models estimated above point to an effect for prefer-
ence divergence across institutions. This null result
holds in a variety of specifications, including models
excluding Congressional Policy Product. This suggests
FIGURE 3 Total Expected Shift in the Income Share of the Top 1%
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that the Senate is a central player in the U.S. policy-
making system. It may be that polarization in the
Senate is the most dramatic contributor to status quo
bias. And this is to some extent anticipated by those
previously making theoretical arguments similar to
ours (Stepan and Linz 2012). Importantly, as we
report in the Supporting Information and Footnote
10, House Polarization does appear to indirectly
influence top shares by affecting Congressional Policy
Product. It is also worth noting that the effects of
status quo bias are generally felt over a long period of
time. In the models that focus most specifically on
variables related to status quo bias, we see error cor-
rection rates of 0.18 and 0.19, meaning that the long-
run effect of these variables are realized at a rate of
only about 19% per year. When policy agreement
becomes harder in the Senate and policy production
declines, the effects persist years into the future.
Conclusion
The analysis above makes both an empirical and
theoretical contribution to our understanding of U.S.
income inequality. We considered how status quo
bias in the American governing system could help
explain changes in inequality over time. On this
front, we have built on previous analysis rooted in
qualitative evidence (Hacker and Pierson 2010) and
time-series analysis that is primarily bivariate in
nature (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Here,
we utilized quantitative time-series analysis that shows
evidence of an effect of status quo bias on top income
shares while controlling for other political and socio-
economic variables. We also went beyond previous
studies by specifying a conditional theory of status quo
bias in which the inequality-inducing effect of status
quo bias is magnified when existing levels of inequality
are high.
The primary conclusion of our analysis is that the
status quo bias created by the design of American
policymaking institutions has contributed to rising
inequality. As Stepan and Linz (2012) have recently
argued, the comparative literature suggests that the
high inequality in the United States compared to
other developed democracies can be explained in part
by unique aspects of the U.S. system, such as the
disproportionate power of the Senate, the malappor-
tionment of the Senate, the existence of the filibuster,
and the high number of veto points. We found
evidence suggesting that some of these factors have
contributed to the increase in top income shares over
time. As the distance between the median Senator
(the pivotal voter in a purely majoritarian institution),
and the filibuster pivot (the pivotal voter under the
current Senate rules) increases, inequality increases as
well. It is particularly hard to shift policy from the status
quo in the United States. When Congressional Policy
Product decreases and policy ‘‘drifts’’ (Hacker and
Pierson 2010), inequality appears to rise. Even after
controlling for policy factors like the top marginal tax
rate and financial deregulation, status quo bias matters
for inequality. Although many factors may lead to rising
inequality, status quo bias makes this process difficult to
reverse. Importantly, we find evidence that the effects of
variables related to institutionalized status quo bias
become larger at higher levels of income concentration,
which provides additional evidence that the effect of
stalemate matters more as conditions favorable to rising
inequality emerge and intensify. However, while we
suggested that both economic and political processes
can sustain rising inequality when status quo bias is
high, our analysis does not consider which may be more
important. We hope future research will disentangle
these two pathways that likely make status quo bias
more inequality inducing as levels of inequality increase.
Future research could also further explore the CSQB
we have uncovered. During the 70 years following the
Great Depression, we observe a substantial relationship
between shifting levels of status quo bias and inequality.
Yet, the last decade has witnessed the highest levels of
inequality and filibuster pivot distance in our period of
study and the lowest levels of Congressional policy
product. It will be important to study the conditional
nature of status quo bias as conditions continue to
change.
Recent work in American politics has given some
reason to believe that changing the distribution of
income in the United States can be achieved through
the democratic political process. Electing different
leaders has implications for inequality (Bartels 2008;
Kelly 2009; Volscho and Kelly 2012). Pursuing dif-
ferent policies shapes the distribution of income
(Hacker and Pierson 2010; Kelly 2005; Volscho and
Kelly 2012). Furthermore, the policies needed to
reduce inequality are not all in the realm of tradi-
tional redistribution. The market itself can be shaped
by governmental decisions, and leveling the playing
field with regard to opportunity is likely to level the
final tally of income. However, our analysis indicates
that the U.S. institutional context obstructs policy
efforts that might fundamentally alter income concen-
tration in the face of current economic conditions.
The evidence here indicates that the filibuster has likely
prevented policy changes that would reduce inequality.
In fact, when we control for variables related to status
conditional status quo bias and top income shares 301
This content downloaded from 128.084.125.208 on March 20, 2018 11:50:10 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
quo bias, we found that partisan control of policy-
making institutions adds almost no additional explan-
atory power. Given these findings and the current
political environment in Congress, the significant
changes to policy that may be required in order to
substantially alter distributional outcomes would appear
challenging to enact without institutional reform.
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